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Comparative/World

JON THARES DAVIDANN. Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. Pp. 262. $95.00.
How and why did the United States and Japan go to
war? Jon Thares Davidann revisits this classic question
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in a study of cross-cultural imaginings and encounters
between the two societies. Complementing standard
works that focused on formal diplomacy and state-running elites, his lucid, staccato-paced volume examines
the role of “public opinion” and “private citizen diplomacy” (p. 2) in the making and breaking of this bilateral
relationship.
Davidann argues that the “unofficial” relationship of
the U.S. and Japan began in the wake of Commodore
Matthew C. Perry’s “opening” of Japan. As the once
self-isolated society quickly transformed into a “modern” industrial nation, a growing number of Americans
sought to build amicable ties with the Japanese. The
engine of this movement was a group of Christian missionaries such as Sidney Gulick and Sherwood Eddy,
who viewed Japan (a little naı̈vely) as a budding democratic nation. In Japan, a community of liberals—most
notably Tsurumi Yusuke and Nitobe Inazo—welcomed
these U.S. overtures and strove to foster goodwill from
the other side of the Pacific. The two sides converged
at the Institute of Pacific Relations, a forum designed
to improve bilateral relations through dialogue and cooperation. Its 1929 meeting in Kyoto, argues Davidann,
marked the “high point of unofficial diplomacy” between the two countries (p. 131).
The advocates of cross-cultural exchange, however,
faced a wall of obstacles. While liberal internationalists
were reaching out across the Pacific, the U.S. press often cast a skeptical eye on Japan, painting it as a rising
military threat built on unchanging Shintoist and “feudalistic” beliefs. The arrival of Japanese immigrants in
Hawai’i and the West Coast triggered fears of a “yellow
peril” and fueled a powerful anti-immigration campaign in the United States. The Kwangtung Army’s aggression in Manchuria planted further distrust in the
minds of Americans, even while liberal missionaries
maintained their sympathy toward the Japanese.
The informal relationship crumbled from the Japanese side as well. The years following the immigration
controversy saw a rise of right-wing tendencies in the
Japanese government. This climate fueled the passion
of conservatives, who avidly supported the imperial
cause. Liberals such as Nitobe sought to repair the ailing alliance, but did so while defending Japanese state
policy. The second Sino-Japanese War virtually “destroyed” (p. 205) the informal rapport of the two societies. Private, person-to-person diplomacy proved
powerless and futile against official agendas as the reluctant Roosevelt administration began to confront the
East Asian threat and as the Japanese government effectively rallied the public through propaganda, censorship, and political pressure. It was a matter of time for
the war to break out—eventually on December 7, 1941.
Davidann’s study has good things to offer. Written in
crisp and smooth prose, it revisits the interwar era
through a careful analysis of English-language sources.
Admirably impartial toward the individuals in discussion, Davidann not only highlights internationalist and
nationalist tendencies in every phase of the tense two
decades but also teases out the prejudices and misun-
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cultural context to specific socioeconomic themes
within the period is a viable way to try to prove a nonevent. Vitally, Gorman’s study also shows the worth of
studying things that do not happen in order to gauge the
“rightness” of decision-making given the possible
courses of action. His decision to end the book with the
signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 makes sense.
Changes in the international system in the 1930s weakened the diplomatic influence of the pact’s supporters;
ultimately they failed to direct world affairs as they had
hoped.
Gorman does an outstanding job of investigating the
Anglo-American attempt to construct an international
society in the post–World War I era. His research is
multinational, multi-archival, and multidisciplinary,
having intellectual depth and breadth. Gorman brings
a political scientist’s sensibility to bear on the evidence,
weaving aspects of religion, culture, sport, and social
and political activism into a rich tapestry of ideas and
beliefs. He explores a range of class issues related to the
various elites present on both sides of the Atlantic,
complementing that analysis with insights regarding the
evolution of middle-class political awareness and involvement in international affairs. Greater public desire to influence international relations in the pursuit of
peace and stability reached its high-water mark in the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. The roots of post–World War II
Anglo-American direction of international governance
and globalization, Gorman argues, are to be found here.
Overall the argument is compelling and presented in
a convincing manner. My only quibbles concern the definition of what a society is and what it is supposed to do,
and the author’s equation of an Atlanticist focus with
one that is truly international. A more sophisticated
and better-developed sense of what an international society based on 1920 norms might be like, coupled with
a more nuanced discussion of what that society expected to achieve, would provide a metric for judging
levels of success or failure. Finally, the ever-present reality of racism and its influence on the internationalist
movement is not dealt with in any significant way. This,
in conjunction with Gorman’s failure to include the rise
of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese influence, makes his
focus Atlanticist rather than international.
There is no doubt, however, that this book makes an
important contribution to the literature on interwar international relations. It deserves a place on the bookshelves of historians interested in exploring relations
between states in the 1920s as it gives insight into the
process of globalization that continued in the post–
World War II and post–Cold War eras.
GREG KENNEDY
King’s College London
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S. C. M PAINE. The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949. New York:
Cambridge University Press. 2012. Pp. xvi, 487. $37.99.
S. C. M. Paine sets out to show the close linkages among
the Chinese civil war, the East Asian regional war (Japan versus both China and Russia), and the global war
(World War II). Suggestively, she sees three “levels” of
these wars as “nested,” with each being a part of the
others and each having many, often tragic, implications
for the others (pp. 9–11). Paine’s synthesis indeed compels the reader to see these wars in a new light; although
there are not many analytical breakthroughs here, the
whole seems greater than the sum of its parts.
This book is mostly a chronicle that piles fact upon
fact, often in an overwhelming degree of detail: battle
follows battle follows battle. The author focuses on
countries, political leaders and strategies, economic
goals, and policies. The “people” receive an occasional
nod but are generally bit players, reacting to situations
and to their leaders; as a group, they are little differentiated. Two examples make the point. Paine notes
that during the “great rebellions” of the nineteenth cen-
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tury, “many Chinese” thought the declining stage of the
Qing dynastic cycle was occurring (p. 268). Who is
meant by “many Chinese”? How many Chinese conceived of a “dynastic cycle”? How many placed their
lives into such a paradigm? Or again, “the masses . . .
concluded that the Communists . . . held the mandate
of Heaven” (p. 268). Were “the masses” really concerned about the mandate of Heaven? Was that conception truly a motivating factor in their political, social, and economic choices?
Paine makes nomenclature of political movements an
important point but without clearly defining the parameters of “incident,” battle, rebellion, civil war, revolution, and war in general. Part of this reflects the perspectives of the East Asian antagonists who chose to
name events so as to reflect their own views and to propagandize their actions in certain ways. But the author
is not consistent here. She accuses the Chinese (p. 109)
of giving the name “rebellion” to many mid-nineteenthcentury movements that were really, she argues, “civil
wars” (including the Boxer uprising, which only involved a few provinces in north China). But in a later
analysis (p. 268), Paine does not hesitate to call these
“civil wars,” as she had analyzed them, simply “the great
rebellions.” In her treatment of the early republic, she
readily identifies three “revolutions”—in 1911, 1913,
and 1915—pointedly not rebellions or civil wars, but
she does not explain what made each of them a “revolution” (pp. 111–112).
Paine’s strongest points concern the regional and
global wars. Her treatment of Japanese and Russian
aims and strategies, of the role of the United States, and
of the tragedy of the Chinese regional and civil wars is
perceptive; especially good in this regard is the first part
of her conclusion (pp. 271–282). But the book is marred
by the irritating repetition of events and their meanings,
probably a result of the author’s choice of organization.
There are errors and inconsistencies in the coverage of
Chinese domestic affairs. For a few examples, Hu Hanmin was not the leader of the Western Hills group (p.
50); Chiang did not return from the Soviet Union in
1923 “favorably impressed” (p. 51). On page 57, the
reader learns that Chiang “had eliminated, neutralized,
or co-opted his most powerful warlord rivals,” only to
read a few pages later (pp. 64 –65) that this was not the
case. Chiang’s successes in state-building are applauded (p. 57) but then downplayed (pp. 68–69). Many
historians would find that the “Nationalists paid careful
attention to the rural crisis” (p. 62) a novel idea. Moreover, the author’s written style seems breezily intemperate. Wuhan was “ground zero [my emphasis] for the
death of the dynastic system” (p. 52); Chiang’s 1927
launching of the White Terror is described as his “[taking] a breather to clean house” (p. 53); the Soong sister
who married H. H. Kung was the “least seductive ” of
the three sisters (p. 55); and “[i]f the Communists had
their way, entire social classes were slated for death” (p.
115).
Paine’s most important contribution is in dealing
(however briefly) with the intangibles of war. She shows

JUNE 2013

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/118/3/823/42547 by William & Mary Libraries user on 05 November 2019

derstandings of both liberals and conservatives. Avoiding deterministic overtones, he successfully captures
the complex thoughts and motives of key American and
Japanese observers—most notably Charles A. Beard,
John Dewey, Gulick, Nitobe, Henry L. Stimson, and
Tsurumi.
Yet the breadth in chronology may have forced some
sacrifices in depth. On the U.S. side, the book’s primary
focus on white men leaves us wanting to know more
about the cross-cultural perspectives of women (which
is covered marginally) and people of color (particularly
African Americans). On the Japanese side, the sole use
of English-language materials opens questions about
the range of Japanese “public opinion.” Here, too, one
can ask about female bridge figures such as Ichikawa
Fusae and Sakanishi Shiho as well as male critics who
wielded wide influence in Japanese society (e.g., Mufofuse Koshin and Oya Soichi). Moreover, the book
largely limits itself to the discourse of Japanese intellectuals, politicians, and journalists—the “elites.” In assessing “popular” sentiment toward U.S. policies and
values, it would be of merit to turn greater attention to
the wider consumers of American music, fashion, movies, and sports (especially baseball)—which appears to
have remained popular in Japan even after official relations began to sour in the 1930s.
Such questions and quibbles aside, this carefully
crafted book about the U.S.-Japanese “road to war” insightfully exposes the limits of unofficial diplomacy in
the face of state-driven conflicts. It also illustrates the
significance of private individuals in shaping cross-cultural exchange in a rapidly changing world. The end result is an engaging study that delivers useful knowledge
to students and scholars of transpacific and international history prior to World War II.
HIROSHI KITAMURA
College of William and Mary

